19 Mar 2020
Ms Sun Xueling
Blk 308B Punggol Walk
#01-364
Waterway Terraces 1
Singapore 822308
Dear Ms Sun,
Civic Responsibility
1. Extracts from an article at aeon.co:
What kind of citizen was he?
There is no dispute about the basic facts of the trial of Socrates. It is less obvious why Athenians found Socrates guilty, and what it might mean today. People who believe in both democracy and the rule of law ought to be very interested in this trial. If the takeaway is either that democracy, as direct self-government by the people, is fatally prone to repress dissent, or that those who dissent against democracy must be regarded as oligarchic traitors, then we are left with a grim choice between democracy and intellectual freedom.
But that is the wrong way to view Socrates’ trial. Rather, the question it answers concerns civic obligation and commitment. The People’s Court convicted Socrates because he refused to accept that a norm of personal responsibility for the effects of public speech applied to his philosophical project. Socrates accepted the guilty verdict as binding, and drank the hemlock, because he acknowledged the authority of the court and the laws under which he was tried. And he did so even though he believed that the jury had made a fundamental mistake in interpreting the law.
In his influential interpretation
The Trial of Socrates (1988), the US journalist-turned-classicist I F Stone saw this trial as an embattled democracy defending itself. In Stone’s view, Socrates had helped to justify the junta’s savage programme of oligarchic misrule and was a traitor. More commonly, Socrates is seen as a victim of an opportunistic prosecutor and a wilfully ignorant citizenry. In truth, politics is indispensable to understanding the trial of Socrates, but in a slightly more sophisticated way. Seeing Socrates as the paradigm of the autonomous individual, as a simple martyr to free speech, is wrong. Athenian political culture and, specifically, the civic commitments required of Athenian citizens are essential to understanding the trial. Socrates’ own commitments to his city influenced the trial’s course, and those commitments were core parts of Athenian political culture, shaping the relationship between public speech and responsibility. Indeed, the actions of Socrates, Meletus and the jury must be understood in the context of the Athenians’ emphasis on the role of the responsible citizen in the democratic state, on their ideal of civic responsibility. Thus it is a story, in many ways, of civic engagement, in some respects far removed from the politics of recognition that characterise contemporary US debates.
Plato’s many dialogues establish the commitments of Socrates the citizen, and paint a vivid portrait of Athenian political culture. In the dialogue
Crito, Socrates explains that despite his conviction, it was not ethically permissible for him to escape from the prison. In
Crito, Plato gives readers a ‘dialogue within a dialogue’, in which the personified Laws of Athens speak to another, counterfactual Socrates. This counterfactual Socrates intends to avoid punishment by escaping from prison and fleeing to some distant land.
The Laws of Athens in Plato’s dialogue are not only the formal, written rules of the Athenian state, but also its civic norms. They ask the counterfactually disobedient Socrates what he found lacking in them, and when he had discovered that lack. The Laws point out to Socrates that it was through them (the laws concerning marriage) that he came into the world. The Laws point out that, through the norms concerning parents’ responsibility for their children, they nurtured him. Finally, through them he received his education. Socrates acknowledges all of this. He willingly accepted those goods, and he acknowledged them as good. Having thus accepted the Laws’ fruits, on what grounds could Socrates now turn around and deny their legitimacy?
The Laws of Athens further point out that Socrates could have left Athens for some other place within the wide Greek world. He would have been free to go. But since he had chosen to stay, he had, the Laws point out, again recognised their rightness. The trial itself, the Laws reminded Socrates, had been conducted in a procedurally correct manner – according to the very rules that Socrates had affirmed by this continued presence.
The Laws concede that the jurors might have erred in their verdict – Socrates’ argument for his innocence might have been better than Meletus’ for his guilt. But that was a human error. It was not the fault of the Laws. The possibility of error on the part of the citizen-jurors who would be his judges was part of the package deal that Socrates had taken up in the course of his upbringing and education, and that he had affirmed by his continued presence in the civic community of Athens. He should know that the Athenian citizens, when gathered as legislators or as judges, were fallible mortals. They could not always get it right.
How did Socrates both scorn the idea of collective wisdom and yet maintain obedience to Athens’ laws, even when he disagreed with how they were interpreted? The rudimentary answer lay in the foundation that Athens (as opposed to, for example, Sparta) provided in its laws and political culture. Athens mandated liberty of public speech and tolerance for a wide range of private behaviour. Moreover, Athenian laws on morally fraught matters, including piety, tended to be more procedure than substance. Thus, the law forbidding impiety did not define piety. It left it open to the jury to decide whether a given action or course of behaviour fell outside the bounds of the community’s standard. It rather provided a specific process for the community to make that decision. This substantive ambiguity benefitted Socrates as it allowed him to pursue his distinctive way of life without violating the letter of the law.
Socrates knew that urging others to abandon ordinary pursuits in favour of philosophy made him unpopular. According to Plato, in his defence speech, Socrates likens his dialogical testing of the opinions of others to the agonising sting of a gadfly: the value of the sting is that it shocks its victim out of the slumberous condition of quotidian existence into a moment of moral clarity. In the best individual case, on Socrates’ terms, that moment initiated a lifetime’s pursuit of genuine human goods. But, as Socrates’ extended gadfly metaphor shows, individual conversion to philosophy was not all that he hoped for. Socrates pairs his analogy of himself as a gadfly to one in which the people of Athens are a beautiful, lazy horse that might be jolted awake by the gadfly’s sting. By his defence speech, as well as by explicit statements from other sources, including other of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates reveals that he understood his life of philosophy as political as well as moral. He aimed at nothing less than converting Athens as a civic community into a just society.
Socrates probably recognised that full-scale civic conversion was an improbable goal. He thought that pursuing the most direct form of political engagement – proposing specific legislation or advocating a general direction for public policy in the citizen assembly – was impossible for him. Nevertheless, he understood his commitment to philosophy as a mission of civic betterment. Athenian political culture expected that a good citizen would exercise any special talents or resources for the good of the community, not merely for himself or his friends and family. Poets would compose publicly performed tragedies or comedies. Skilled singers and dancers would perform in state-sponsored choruses. The courageous would fight on the front lines. The rich would contribute generously to public works. In the words of Pericles (in the Funeral Oration attributed to him in Thucydides’
History of the Peloponnesian War): ‘We regard the citizen who takes no part in these public duties not as unambitious but as useless.’ Contributing to public life was part, maybe the highest part, of what it meant to fully be a man.
Socrates’ defence speech was an act of profound civic courage, the same sort of courage that led Athenian soldiers to die in defence of their country. It was an act of civic respect that recognised the jurors as adults who might benefit from a logical argument. And, for all its seeming intellectual arrogance, it was an act of civic solidarity – an assertion that Socrates the philosopher was also Socrates the Athenian citizen who owed an account of his actions to his fellow citizens. Far from a simple drama pitting democracy against intellectual freedom, the trial of Socrates is a deep drama of civic engagement, tragic in its outcome, but at the same time revealing that democracy makes space for acts of profound heroism.
Today, in the 21st century, free speech is deeply entangled with issues of personal and group identity. In our moment, there is real value in reflecting on the centrality of civic duty in the trial of Socrates, a foundational moment in the history of free thought and democratic action. What will we have lost when the idea of civic duty, as exemplified by the relationship between Socrates and his democratic city, no longer gains purchase on our own thought and actions?
2. Extracts from another article at aeon.co:
Is virtue signalling a perversion of morality?
People engage in moral talk all the time. When they make moral claims in public, one common response is to dismiss them as virtue signallers. Twitter is full of these accusations: the actress Jameela Jamil is a ‘pathetic virtue-signalling twerp’, according to the journalist Piers Morgan; climate activists are virtue signallers, according to the conservative Manhattan Institute for Policy Research; vegetarianism is virtue signalling, according to the author Bjorn Lomborg (as these examples illustrate, the accusation seems more common from the Right than the Left).
The accusation that virtue signalling is hypocritical might be cashed out in two different ways. We might mean that virtue signallers are really concerned with displaying themselves in the best light – and not with climate change, animal welfare or what have you. That is, we might question their motives. In their recent paper, the management scholars Jillian Jordan and David Rand asked if people would virtue signal when no one was watching. They found that their participants’ responses were sensitive to opportunities for signalling: after a moral violation was committed, the reported degree of moral outrage was reduced when the participants had better opportunities to signal virtue. But the entire experiment was anonymous, so no one could link moral outrage to specific individuals. This suggests that, while virtue signalling is part (but only part) of the explanation for why we feel certain emotions, we nevertheless genuinely feel them, and we don’t express them just because we’re virtue signalling.
The second way of cashing out the hypocrisy accusation is the thought that virtue signallers might actually lack the virtue that they try to display. Dishonest signalling is also widespread in evolution. For instance, some animals mimic the honest signal that others give of being poisonous or venomous – hoverflies that imitate wasps, for example. It’s likely that some human virtue signallers are engaged in dishonest mimicry too. But dishonest signalling is worth engaging in only when there are sufficiently many honest signallers for it make sense to take such signals into account. While some virtue signallers might be hypocritical, the majority probably are not. So on the whole, virtue signalling has its place in moral discourse, and we shouldn’t be so ready to denigrate it.
3. Of the two articles above, the last three paragraphs of Item 1 define civic responsibility and the three paragraphs in Item 2 answer the question whether virtue signalling is hypocrisy.
I submitted documents at MPS Ang Mo Kio in 2018 and 2019 with a view to an investigation by parliament. MP’s Responsibilities (72) quoted the duties of MP. My letters and emails listed the issues including evidence to show that officers did not reply to the mistakes made.
The problem has to do with misconduct and transgression of rules.
It will require parliament to ask how loopholes allowed officers to operate the way they did, about the distribution of power and the role of leadership.
4. At the MPS of 10 Feb, I requested that the petition writer write to the MP whether she could bring up the problem in parliament. I amended the two sentences he wrote in the petition form and he asked me to countersign the amendment. The text served as input for an electronic record to be transmitted to the MP. The text was:
"[My name] seek your assistance in raising the problem in parliament.
He has written 10 times to you about bringing up the problem in parliament."
Real Accountability (72) handed over at the MPS had the same effect and was emailed to the PM, DPM and MP the next day.
5. Since my letter MP’s Responsibilities (72) of 7 Oct, the case has not been brought up in parliament sitting of 4 Nov to 5 Nov, 6 Jan, 3 Feb to 4 Feb, 18 Feb, 26 Feb to 28 Feb and 2 Mar to 6 Mar. I showed in Debunking (72) of 29 Nov the reason you gave for not bringing up the problem in parliament cannot be true. After attending your MPS with Infallibility (72) of 23 Dec and Real Accountability (72) of 10 Feb, I have not received your reply.
Yours Sincerely,
hh
cc
Mr Lee Hsien Loong
Mr Heng Swee Keat
Mr Teo Chee Hean
Observation
Letter handed over at MPS for the problem to be brought up in Parliament:
Civic Responsibility
Extracts from two articles at aeon.co:
1. “Today, in the 21st century, free speech is deeply entangled with issues of personal and group identity. In our moment, there is real value in reflecting on the centrality of civic duty in the trial of Socrates, a foundational moment in the history of free thought and democratic action. What will we have lost when the idea of civic duty, as exemplified by the relationship between Socrates and his democratic city, no longer gains purchase on our own thought and actions?”
2. “The second way of cashing out the hypocrisy accusation is the thought that virtue signallers might actually lack the virtue that they try to display. Dishonest signalling is also widespread in evolution. For instance, some animals mimic the honest signal that others give of being poisonous or venomous – hoverflies that imitate wasps, for example. It’s likely that some human virtue signallers are engaged in dishonest mimicry too. But dishonest signalling is worth engaging in only when there are sufficiently many honest signallers for it make sense to take such signals into account. While some virtue signallers might be hypocritical, the majority probably are not. So on the whole, virtue signalling has its place in moral discourse, and we shouldn’t be so ready to denigrate it.”
3. Of the two articles above, the last three paragraphs of Item 1 define civic responsibility and the three paragraphs in Item 2 answer the question whether virtue signalling is hypocrisy.
I submitted documents at MPS Ang Mo Kio in 2018 and 2019 with a view to an investigation by parliament. MP’s Responsibilities (72) quoted the duties of MP. My letters and emails listed the issues including evidence to show that officers did not reply to the mistakes made.
The problem has to do with misconduct and transgression of rules.
It will require parliament to ask how loopholes allowed officers to operate the way they did, about the distribution of power and the role of leadership.
4. At the MPS of 10 Feb, I requested that the petition writer write to the MP whether she could bring up the problem in parliament. I amended the two sentences he wrote in the petition form and he asked me to countersign the amendment. The text served as input for an electronic record to be transmitted to the MP. The text was:
"[My name] seek your assistance in raising the problem in parliament.
He has written 10 times to you about bringing up the problem in parliament."
Real Accountability (72) handed over at the MPS had the same effect and was emailed to the PM, DPM and MP the next day.
5. Since my letter MP’s Responsibilities (72) of 7 Oct, the case has not been brought up in parliament sitting of 4 Nov to 5 Nov, 6 Jan, 3 Feb to 4 Feb, 18 Feb, 26 Feb to 28 Feb and 2 Mar to 6 Mar. I showed in Debunking (72) of 29 Nov the reason you gave for not bringing up the problem in parliament cannot be true. After attending your MPS with Infallibility (72) of 23 Dec and Real Accountability (72) of 10 Feb, I have not received your reply.