An Examination of Research Theory Yang Qianru
In terms of monarchy, the common understanding of history is that from the Western Zhou until the end of the Eastern Zhou there was only one actual state, that of the Zhou king, and all the princely states were feudal dependencies of the Zhou Son of Heaven and hence belonged to the Zhou royal house and could not be considered as independent states in their own right. But the historical reality is that from the eighth to the third century BCE the hold of the Zhou king was gradually relaxed. The Zhou court’s overall grasp and authority were constantly weakened so that from the Western Zhou feudal era on, it no longer had the means to carry out its role of upholding the political order and system of power. In the Spring and Autumn Period (eighth to sixth century BCE), several large princely states already had two basic features of the modern “state”: sovereignty and territory. Not only did the states have independent and autonomous sovereignty, they also had very clear borders. By the time of the Warring States Period (fifth to third century BCE), states proliferated and entered into several centuries of competition to unify all under heaven under their own rule, while the Zhou royal domain sank to the level of a small, weak state. Hence, some scholars think that the way in which the various princely states gave feudal homage to the Zhou king as their common lord from the eighth to the third century BCE was rather like the relationship of the members of today’s Commonwealth to Great Britain. They accept the Queen as head of the Commonwealth but enjoy equal and independent status along with Great Britain. In a PhD dissertation from the War Strategies Faculty of the International University titled “The Politics of State Alliances in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Period,” Zhou Yi describes the states of this period as “politically behaved bodies.” This description is more accurate than the term states.
Bearing this in mind, I think that the name “pre-Qin interstate political philosophy” is acceptable on academic grounds and is appropriate because the pre-Qin states--following the decline of the Western Zhou feudal system and the destruction of the previous harmony and balanced order between the Zhou royal house and the various states, from the Five Hegemons of the Spring and Autumn era to the Seven Powers of the Warring States up until the “great unification” of the Qin-Han--on the grounds of protecting their own security, sought to develop and resolve the relationships among themselves and the central royal house and thus they accumulated a rich and prolific experience in politics and diplomacy. This complicated and complex political configuration created the space for scholarship to look at the international system, state relations, and interstate political philosophy. The pre-Qin masters wrote books and advanced theories trying to sell to the rulers their ideas on how to run the state and conduct diplomacy and military strategy while they played major roles in advocating strategies of becoming either a humane ruler or a hegemon, making either vertical (North-South) or horizontal (East-West) alliances, or either creating alliances or going to war. Scholars who have researched the history of thought have looked only at one side and emphasized the value of pre-Qin masters’ thought as theory (philosophical, historical, or political), whereas most of these ideas were used to serve practical political and diplomatic purposes among the states. Their effectiveness both then and now is proven. Therefore, there is no doubt about the positive and practical role of researching the foreign relations, state politics, and military strategies of the pre-Qin classics or of applying the insights gleaned from studying these masters to international political thought by gathering together, from out of several thousand years of the legacy of historical culture, a specifically Chinese wisdom of theoretical principles and ways of thinking with a view to guiding current research and combining this with China’s present rise and its diplomatic strategy.
The Two Poles of Confucianism Xu Jin
Areas of Agreement
Like Xunzi, Mencius sets his analytical level not at that of the state but rather at that of the individual. In his analysis, the nature of the state is only a mediating variable. The basic cause that determines the nature of the state is the ruler. A given type of ruler leads to a given type of state. A ruler who implements humane authority will have a humane state, whereas a ruler who implements hegemony will have a hegemonic state. In this way, the ruler himself will ultimately shape and determine the features of the entire international system. Mencius and Xunzi had good reasons for doing their analysis at the individual level. A state is a political organization formed by human beings. In the linguistic system of contemporary international relations theory, idioms such as a state thinks or a state decides use the word state synecdochically. In fact, a state itself cannot think or decide. It has no way of acting. What can think, decide, and act are the people in the state, especially the ruler. Therefore, Mencius thinks that the ruler and the state are of the same nature. Often in his writings he refers to the ruler in place of the state, as for instance, “O King, if you should but implement benevolent governance for the people,” or “if the king goes to punish them, who will oppose the king?” or if the ruler of the state likes benevolence, he will have no enemies in all under heaven.” In fact, it is not the ruler himself who has no enemies in all under heaven; it is rather the state, which the ruler who likes benevolence represents.
Xunzi is a conceptual determinist whereas Mencius is a conceptual determinist with a tendency toward dialectic. They both think that the persons of the ruler and the ministers are the original motivation for all state conduct. Mencius’s dialectical tendency lies in his denial that force has any importance to a state that aspires to humane authority. But he recognizes the important role of force to any state that aspires to hegemony. He says, “Using force and pretending to benevolence is the hegemon. The hegemon will certainly have a large state. Using virtue and practicing benevolence is the sage king. The sage king does not rely on having a large territory. Tang had seventy square kilometers and King Wen had a hundred square kilometers. Should you make people submit to force rather than to the heart, force will never suffice; should you make people submit to virtue, they will heartily rejoice and sincerely follow, as the seventy disciples followed Confucius.” This passage says that to become a hegemon a state must be large and powerful, whereas to become a humane authority a state relies not on military force but on the attractive force of morality, which causes other states readily and sincerely to submit and come to the king. Furthermore, Mencius even more than Xunzi points out clearly that it is enough to rely on the will of the ruler and the ministers. Their firm determination can affect a rapid change from hegemon to humane ruler or from humane ruler to hegemon. Mencius encourages King Xuan of Qi to implement royal government by saying, “Hence the ruler is not a humane ruler because he does not act as one, not because he cannot.”
Points of Partial Similarity
On hegemony Xunzi and Mencius part company. Xunzi thinks that humane authority is the ideal form of power and hence deserves being promoted, whereas tyranny is the worst form of power and hence should be opposed. He has no moral reaction to hegemony nor is he opposed to its existence. On the contrary, he implicitly supposes that a hegemonic state must have a considerable degree of morality even if its morality falls far short of that of a humane authority. He says,
Although virtue may not be up to the mark or norms fully realized, yet when the principle of all under heaven is somewhat gathered together, punishments and rewards are already trusted by all under heaven, all below the ministers know what they can expect. Once administrative commands are made plain, even if one sees one’s chance for gain defeated, yet there is no cheating the people; contracts are already sealed, even if one sees one’s chance for gain defeated, yet there is no cheating one’s partners. If it is so, then the troops will be strong and the town will be firm and enemy states will tremble in fear. Once it is clear the state stands united, your allies will trust you. Even if you have a remote border state, your reputation will cause all under heaven to quiver. Such were the Five Lords. Hence Huan of Qi, Wen of Jin, Zhuang of Chu, Helu of Wu, and Goujian of Yue all had states that were on the margin, yet they overawed all under heaven and their strength overpowered the central states. There was no other reason for this but that they had strategic reliability. This is to attain hegemony by establishing strategic reliability.This passage means that even if the morality of a hegemonic state is not perfect, it understands the basic moral norms of this world. The domestic and international policy of a hegemonic state must take as its principle reliability in its strategies. Domestically it should not cheat the people and externally it should not cheat its allies.
Mencius also thinks that humane authority is the ideal form of international power and most worth aspiring to, but he is vehemently opposed to hegemony. He thinks that even if a hegemonic state succeeds in dominating the whole world, its span will be brief and illegitimate and it will not win the support of many countries because a hegemonic state “uses force to subdue people.” The biggest problem with using force to subdue people is that the states that follow one “will not follow from their hearts, but because their strength is insufficient,” and therefore they will look for opportunity to rebel. Moreover, although hegemons’ false benevolence, fake justice, and paucity of goodness may allow them to cheat people for a while, it cannot be forever. The result of their lack of benevolence will become apparent and as a consequence they will lose the minds of the people and end up losing hegemony. Mencius goes on to say that a state that seeks hegemony for itself risks its own security, because that type of state must practice hegemonic government and this requires seeking profit in everything, and seeking profit in everything will upset the orthodox order of society. He says, “If ministers serve their prince with an eye to profit and sons serve their fathers with an eye to profit and younger brothers serve their older brothers with an eye to profit, so you end up expelling benevolence and justice between rulers and ministers, fathers and sons, and older and younger brothers and all draw close to one another with an eye to profit, such a society has never avoided collapse.” Furthermore, promoting hegemonic government will make all large states yours enemies and they will fight with your allies. This requires an expenditure of state force and is a threat to the life and property of the people. Mencius uses the example of King Hui of Liang pursuing profit alone with the result that the power of his state went into decline to explain that profit is a danger to the state and the ordinary people. He says, ”For the sake of territory. King Hui of Liang trampled his people to pulp and took them to war. He suffered a great defeat but returned again only fearful that he would not win so he urged on the son whom he loved and buried him along with the dead. This is what is called ‘starting with what one does not love and going on to what one does love.’” Thus, he concludes, “The three dynasties acquired all under heaven by benevolence and they lost it through lack of benevolence. This is the reason why states decline or flourish, rise or fall. If the Son of Heaven is not benevolence, he cannot retain what is within the four seas. If feudal lords are not benevolent they cannot retain the altars of soil and grain.”
Points of Difference
Understanding of State Power
Although Mencius and Xunzi both emphasize the importance of political power and acknowledge it as the primary factor in state power, they have different opinions about the degree of importance of political power. Mencius greatly respects political power and depreciates the importance of economic and military power, whereas Xunzi thinks that all three are necessary, but political power is the foundation for the exercise of economic and military power.
The difference in view of Mencius and Xunzi on the issue of state power may be owing to a difference in political philosophy. Mencius is a pure ethical idealist who believes that for the state to simply seek material goods, especially to raise its military power, is harmful. He uses the example of King Hui of Liang, who set his sights purely on profit, as quoted earlier. In contrast, a state that seeks benevolence and justice can attain humane authority over all under heaven and will have no enemies at all.
Mencius argues,
With a territory of a hundred square kilometers, it is possible to be king. O King, if you should implement benevolent governance for the people, reduce punishments, lighten taxes and duties, allowing for deeper plowing and ensuring that weeding is well done, then the fit will spend their holidays practicing filial piety, brotherly affection, loyalty, and constancy. At home they will serve their parents and elders; outside they will serve their masters; then they can but take wooden staves in hand and attack the armored troops of Qin [in the northwest] and Chu [in the south], whose rulers steal their people’s time so that they are not able to plow or hoe to support their parents. Their parents freeze and starve; their brothers, wives, and children are dispersed. They set pitfalls for their people or drown them. If the king goes punish them, who will oppose the king? Thus it is said, “The benevolent has no enemies.”This is to say that a state that speaks of benevolence and justice and implements benevolent government will be united internally. Political motivation will be strong. In contrast, a state that speaks of gain and implements hegemonic government will be rent apart internally and its political motivation will be weak. In a conflict between a king and a hegemon, the king can win without a fight.
The Origin of Conflict
Xunzi believes that human nature is evil and Mencius believes that it is good. Their viewpoints are diametrically opposed, and this leads them to equally opposed views about the origin of conflict. Xunzi thinks that there is no end to desires and that material goods cannot satisfy them. Since desires cannot be satisfied, people will go on seeking more. This quest will never end and hence it will give rise to competition, which will continue and break out in violent conflict. He says, “When man is born he has desires. Though desires are unfulfilled, yet he cannot but seek. If he seeks, and has no limits set, then he cannot but conflict with others. If he conflicts with others there will be disorder, and if there is disorder there will be poverty.”
First, Mencius thinks, not that human nature is originally good, but that human beings have a natural inclination toward the good, that is, that they have an a prior basis for being good. These naturally good tendencies need to be directed, educated, and fostered before they can be fully expressed--that is, nature may move toward goodness and hence the goodness of human nature is a process. Mencius says, “It is no surprise the king is not wise. Although there are plants in the world that grow easily, yet with one day of sunshine and ten days of frost, they will not be able to grow. I see you very rarely, and the moment I leave the Jack Frost come. I may bring out some buds, but to what good?” That is, even though the king has the seeds of goodness in his heart, yet they cannot grow properly with one day of violence or ten of cold. This is especially so when Mencius leaves, since the people who lead the king to fall into injustice (the frost) will gather around him and egg him on to do wrong. Therefore, Mencius’s theory of goodness of human nature says, not that human nature is originally good, but that the heart has seeds of goodness, which may be developed to do good.”
Ways to Resolve International Conflict
Xunzi thinks that increasing the material goods and wealth of a society will not resolve the conflict that may arise between people, because human desires will increase along with the increases in wealth and will continue to rise. He advocates using the rationality of the mind to control desires, and he believes that the way to strengthen the rationality of the human mind is to establish social norms (rites). Norms can make human desires reasonable and can also increase the capacity for satisfaction. When desires decrease and the capacity for satisfaction increases, then the two will easily come into balance. Moreover, norms can also distinguish social classes, so people will act according to the norms proper to their class and thus avoid conflict arising. Xunzi’s reliance on external forces to suppress conflict is at one with his philosophical theory of the evil of human nature.
Mencius’s resolution of international conflict is quite different from Xunzi’s. Since he advocates the goodness of human nature, Mencius believes that the idea of goodness in the human mind will ultimately overcome evil desires. Of course, Mencius believes in the effectiveness of “rites” in suppressing conflict between people, but he is faced with a world in which “rites are dethroned and music is bad.” Therefore, the first thing to be done is to restore the ritual order. Hence he proposes a two-step strategy. The first step is to use persuasion and education to influence the rulers so that the goodness in their minds will suppress the evil. As for who can carry out this task, Mencius believes that it is worthy people like himself. Therefore, Mencius spent his life going from state to state (he visited Zou, Lu, Qi, Wei, and Tang). On his arrival he would first preach to the rulers the way of benevolence and justice with the aim of transforming them from their tendency to ”talk of profit rather than talk of justice.” Through education, he would form and enlighten the goodness of their minds so that the inherent nature of benevolence, justice, rites, and wisdom would shine out and so that benevolent government would lay a foundation for thought.
Xunzi lived at the end of the Warring States Period. By that time, Qin had already become the undisputed hegemon and had the power to unify China. Hence, the key political question then was in what way Qin would unify all under heaven. The previous unified world (all under heaven) had been the feudal system of the Western Zhou. Since this system had been idealized by Confucius and other Confucians as the system of Five Services, and its creation ascribed to King Wu of the Zhou and the duke of Zhou, Xunzi was bound to uphold this form of unified world.
Mencius lived in the mid-Warring States era. This was a time when the various states were in chaos and no one state could come to the fore and emerge as a hegemon, as Qin would later do. Mencius also hoped for unity in all under heaven and for a return to the feudal system of the Western Zhou, but given the conditions of international politics in his time it was very difficult to realize this hope. Hence although Mencius himself was confident about this goal, he had to realize that his duty at the time was to make people wake up and stop chaotic war. This can be seen in his dialogue with King Hui of Liang:
Suddenly he asked me, “How can all under heaven be calmed?”
I replied, “It can be calmed by being united.”
“Who can unite it?”
I replied, “One who does not like killing others can unite it.”
“Who can give it to him?”
I replied, “There is nobody in all under heaven who will not give it to him.”
This exchange shows that Mencius was very busy trying to put the idea of benevolence and justice into the ruler’s mind and trying hard to form one ruler or several who could stop international wars. It was not yet the time for establishing international norms, since if peoples’ minds were not first correct, then even if there were norms in place no one would want to implement them with any sincerity.
Political Hegemony in Ancient China Wang Rihua
The Basic Structure of Political Hegemony
The theory of political hegemony holds that the core factor of hegemony is political power, and the heart of political power is the ability of the government to govern the state and its influence. According to the summary in chapter 3, the hegemonic theory in The Stratagems of the Warring States holds that “political power is the core of hegemonic power.” Moreover, in the discussion of military power and geographical factors as against political power, it stresses the importance of political power: “Rely on politics; do not rely on courage.” Yan and Huang go on to point out that “the merits and leadership of the ruler and chief ministers are frequently seen as the core factors in hegemonic political power.” Political power is expressed mainly in two aspects: the first is the leadership, or, better, the ability to govern, of the government; the second is the virtue and self-cultivation of the important officials in the government and the political influence that flows from this.
The theory of political hegemony holds that the government’s ability to govern, especially that of the ruler and important ministers, determines the fate of the hegemony. Mozi points out, “Huan of Qi was influenced by Guan Zhong and Bao Shu; Wen of Jin was influenced by Jiu Fan and Gao Yan; Zhuang of Chu was influenced by Sun Shu and Shen Yi; Helu of Wu was influenced by Wu Yuan and Wen Yi; Goujian of Yue as influenced by Fan Li and Minister Zhong. What these five princes were influenced by was correct, and so they held hegemony over the feudal lords. Their deeds and fame was passed down to later generations. When Bao Shuya recommends Guan Zhong as prime minister, he says, “You, O Prince, wish to be a hegemonic king; without Guan Yiwu, it is not possible.” After Guan Zhong had become the prime minister of Qi, he did indeed help Qi to establish hegemony. Confucius also acknowledged that “Guan Zhong served Duke Huan, who was hegemon over the feudal lords.” And, “Duke Huan gathered the feudal lords from nine directions not by troops and chariots but by the strength of Guan Zhong.” On the contrary, the economic and military power of Qin were both the best, yet the reason Qin was unable to be hegemon was in part because of “the clumsiness of its ministers in charge of planning.” Therefore, the theory of political hegemony proposes “worthy princes and enlightened prime ministers,” and firmly believes that “when the worthy person is present, then all under heaven submits; and in the use of one person, all under heaven will obey.”
Political hegemony stresses that moral influence is of capital importance. Moral influence comes from the merit and self-cultivation of the ruler and his important chief ministers and the policies that derive from this. Virtuous conduct is the basic requirement of the lord of the covenants, or rather of the hegemonic lord: “A great state determines by justice and thereby becomes the lord of the covenants.” And, “Without virtue how can one be lord of the covenants?” Duke Huan of Qi “relieved poverty, and paid the worthy and capable” and undertook to “examine our borders, return seized territory; correct the border marks” and to “not accept their money or wealth.” In this way he secured the hegemony for Qi. Duke Wen of Jin “revised his administration and spread grace on the ordinary people” and in this way realized the hegemony for Jin. Qin had a wealthy state and a strong army but, because the virtue of Duke Mu of Qin was inferior, in Qin “laws and commands were constantly issued.” “Laws was severe and lacking in mercy, only relying on coercion to keep people submissive.” Therefore, “it is fitting that Mu of Qin did not become lord of the covenants. Political hegemony holds that fidelity is the most important constituent component of moral influence: “fidelity so as to implement justice; justice so as to implement decrees.” Xunzi notes, “Huan of Qi, Wen of Jin, Zhuang of Chu, Helu of Wu, and Goujian of Yue all had states that were on the margins, yet they overawed all under heaven and their strength overpowered the central states. There was no other reason for this but that they had strategic reliability. This is to attain hegemony by establishing strategic reliability.”
The theory of political hegemony does not exclude the necessary of material power. The international political philosophy of ancient China held that power that was material in nature and influence that was moral in nature were two basic aspects that constituted power: “The means by which Jin became a hegemon was the military tactics of its generals and the strength of its ministers.” Also Mencius says, “Using force and pretending to benevolence is the hegemon. The hegemon will certainly have a large state.” Hence, “for a state to maintain its hegemonic status, equal emphasis must be given to virtue, awe, and fidelity.”
The formation of political influence is a hierarchical process. Ancient China’s international political philosophy and contemporary Western international relations theory both stress the use of hierarchical analysis to observe and analyze the world, and construct a theory of world politics. The difference between them is that in ancient China’s international political philosophy there were four levels of analysis: the individual, the household, the state and the world. Amony these four levels there exists a hierarchy and a relationship of cause and effect; thus
A Realist Scholar Lu Xin
Academic Stance
Lu Xin: Some people describe you as a specialist in making predictions on international questions. Which are the occasions you are most proud of?
Yan Xuetong: I predicted Lee Tenghui would go from covert to overt support for a policy of independence for Taiwan. I predicted that the Kuomintang would be defeated and Chen Shui-bian would be elected. I predicted he would be rejected for a second term in office. I predicted that Pakistan would certainly carry out a nuclear test in response to India’s. In 1997, I predicted that the Clinton government would not agree to restoring reciprocal state visits between China and the United States. In 2005, I predicted that Sino-Japanese relations would continue to deteriorate. When I moved to Tsinghua University, I began to make quantitative predictions and the percentage of my predictions that were correct rose.
I think that predicting is especially enjoyable and very challenging. A forecaster must constantly keep an eye on shifts in circumstances, always worrying what to do if he is wrong and ready to analysis why he is wrong, so people are always kept on their toes. It is a little like playing the stock market. The difference is that there is no material benefit involved, only mental enjoyment. Using scientific, quantitative prediction methods allows us constantly to increase the accuracy of our predictions. Our current quantitative predictions have already reached world-class level, especially in our method of quantitative assessment of bilateral relationships. Our work can stand alongside that of others in the world.
Lu Xin: You seem to be particularly enthusiastic speaking about this issue. Maybe it has something to do with your personality. You like being challenged.
Yan Xuetong: This may be wherein the special feature of international relations studies lies. To study international relations means to predict the developing trends in the international situation. Everybody judges you on whether your predictions are accurate or not. The predictions are objective and are a most plausible proof. Making public predictions is a risky business. Making public predictions about the international situation is a bit like adults playing games--it is real and enjoyable. Especially so when we use scientific methods to make a prediction. According to the results we can summarize the experience of our method and improve our method of prediction. It is especially meaningful to invent a method of research, just as interesting as inventing a new weapon.
Observation
(Extract from the book Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power)
Political hegemony stresses that moral influence is of capital importance. Moral influence comes from the merit and self-cultivation of the ruler and his important chief ministers and the policies that derive from this. Virtuous conduct is the basic requirement of the lord of the covenants, or rather of the hegemonic lord: “A great state determines by justice and thereby becomes the lord of the covenants.” And, “Without virtue how can one be lord of the covenants?” Duke Huan of Qi “relieved poverty, and paid the worthy and capable” and undertook to “examine our borders, return seized territory; correct the border marks” and to “not accept their money or wealth.” In this way he secured the hegemony for Qi. Duke Wen of Jin “revised his administration and spread grace on the ordinary people” and in this way realized the hegemony for Jin. Qin had a wealthy state and a strong army but, because the virtue of Duke Mu of Qin was inferior, in Qin “laws and commands were constantly issued.” “Laws was severe and lacking in mercy, only relying on coercion to keep people submissive.” Therefore, “it is fitting that Mu of Qin did not become lord of the covenants. Political hegemony holds that fidelity is the most important constituent component of moral influence: “fidelity so as to implement justice; justice so as to implement decrees.” Xunzi notes, “Huan of Qi, Wen of Jin, Zhuang of Chu, Helu of Wu, and Goujian of Yue all had states that were on the margins, yet they overawed all under heaven and their strength overpowered the central states. There was no other reason for this but that they had strategic reliability. This is to attain hegemony by establishing strategic reliability.”
Political Hegemony in Ancient China Wang Rihua
The Basic Structure of Political Hegemony
The theory of political hegemony holds that the core factor of hegemony is political power, and the heart of political power is the ability of the government to govern the state and its influence. According to the summary in chapter 3, the hegemonic theory in The Stratagems of the Warring States holds that “political power is the core of hegemonic power.” Moreover, in the discussion of military power and geographical factors as against political power, it stresses the importance of political power: “Rely on politics; do not rely on courage.” Yan and Huang go on to point out that “the merits and leadership of the ruler and chief ministers are frequently seen as the core factors in hegemonic political power.” Political power is expressed mainly in two aspects: the first is the leadership, or, better, the ability to govern, of the government; the second is the virtue and self-cultivation of the important officials in the government and the political influence that flows from this.
The theory of political hegemony holds that the government’s ability to govern, especially that of the ruler and important ministers, determines the fate of the hegemony. Mozi points out, “Huan of Qi was influenced by Guan Zhong and Bao Shu; Wen of Jin was influenced by Jiu Fan and Gao Yan; Zhuang of Chu was influenced by Sun Shu and Shen Yi; Helu of Wu was influenced by Wu Yuan and Wen Yi; Goujian of Yue as influenced by Fan Li and Minister Zhong. What these five princes were influenced by was correct, and so they held hegemony over the feudal lords. Their deeds and fame was passed down to later generations. When Bao Shuya recommends Guan Zhong as prime minister, he says, “You, O Prince, wish to be a hegemonic king; without Guan Yiwu, it is not possible.” After Guan Zhong had become the prime minister of Qi, he did indeed help Qi to establish hegemony. Confucius also acknowledged that “Guan Zhong served Duke Huan, who was hegemon over the feudal lords.” And, “Duke Huan gathered the feudal lords from nine directions not by troops and chariots but by the strength of Guan Zhong.” On the contrary, the economic and military power of Qin were both the best, yet the reason Qin was unable to be hegemon was in part because of “the clumsiness of its ministers in charge of planning.” Therefore, the theory of political hegemony proposes “worthy princes and enlightened prime ministers,” and firmly believes that “when the worthy person is present, then all under heaven submits; and in the use of one person, all under heaven will obey.”
Political hegemony stresses that moral influence is of capital importance. Moral influence comes from the merit and self-cultivation of the ruler and his important chief ministers and the policies that derive from this. Virtuous conduct is the basic requirement of the lord of the covenants, or rather of the hegemonic lord: “A great state determines by justice and thereby becomes the lord of the covenants.” And, “Without virtue how can one be lord of the covenants?” Duke Huan of Qi “relieved poverty, and paid the worthy and capable” and undertook to “examine our borders, return seized territory; correct the border marks” and to “not accept their money or wealth.” In this way he secured the hegemony for Qi. Duke Wen of Jin “revised his administration and spread grace on the ordinary people” and in this way realized the hegemony for Jin. Qin had a wealthy state and a strong army but, because the virtue of Duke Mu of Qin was inferior, in Qin “laws and commands were constantly issued.” “Laws was severe and lacking in mercy, only relying on coercion to keep people submissive.” Therefore, “it is fitting that Mu of Qin did not become lord of the covenants. Political hegemony holds that fidelity is the most important constituent component of moral influence: “fidelity so as to implement justice; justice so as to implement decrees.” Xunzi notes, “Huan of Qi, Wen of Jin, Zhuang of Chu, Helu of Wu, and Goujian of Yue all had states that were on the margins, yet they overawed all under heaven and their strength overpowered the central states. There was no other reason for this but that they had strategic reliability. This is to attain hegemony by establishing strategic reliability.”
The theory of political hegemony does not exclude the necessary of material power. The international political philosophy of ancient China held that power that was material in nature and influence that was moral in nature were two basic aspects that constituted power: “The means by which Jin became a hegemon was the military tactics of its generals and the strength of its ministers.” Also Mencius says, “Using force and pretending to benevolence is the hegemon. The hegemon will certainly have a large state.” Hence, “for a state to maintain its hegemonic status, equal emphasis must be given to virtue, awe, and fidelity.”
The formation of political influence is a hierarchical process. Ancient China’s international political philosophy and contemporary Western international relations theory both stress the use of hierarchical analysis to observe and analyze the world, and construct a theory of world politics. The difference between them is that in ancient China’s international political philosophy there were four levels of analysis: the individual, the household, the state and the world. Amony these four levels there exists a hierarchy and a relationship of cause and effect; thus
Cultivate yourself, manage your family, administer the state, and bring peace to all under heaven.Or again, “When you have cultivated yourself, then manage your family; when your family is managed, then administer the state; when the state is administered, then all under heaven is at peace.” Different levels of material power and their corresponding levels of morality determine the levels of power in the international political system. In the Spring and Autumn Period, after Qi had attained hegemony. Duke Huan of Qi hoped to go one step further and develop to the level of humane authority. Hence he says to Guan Zhong, “I wanted to be a hegemon and, thanks to the efforts of you and your companions, I have become a hegemon. Now I want to be sage king. It is possible.” Guan Zhong and his fellow ministers tactfully tell the duke that since his virtue has not yet reached the level of a sage king, Qi could not realize humane authority. Duke Huan therefore renounces pursuit of human authority and remains content with hegemony.
Of old those who wished to make their bright virtue shine in all under heaven first administered their state. Those who wished to administer their state first managed their family. Those who wished to manage their family first cultivated their person.
A Realist Scholar Lu Xin
Academic Stance
Lu Xin: Some people describe you as a specialist in making predictions on international questions. Which are the occasions you are most proud of?
Yan Xuetong: I predicted Lee Tenghui would go from covert to overt support for a policy of independence for Taiwan. I predicted that the Kuomintang would be defeated and Chen Shui-bian would be elected. I predicted he would be rejected for a second term in office. I predicted that Pakistan would certainly carry out a nuclear test in response to India’s. In 1997, I predicted that the Clinton government would not agree to restoring reciprocal state visits between China and the United States. In 2005, I predicted that Sino-Japanese relations would continue to deteriorate. When I moved to Tsinghua University, I began to make quantitative predictions and the percentage of my predictions that were correct rose.
I think that predicting is especially enjoyable and very challenging. A forecaster must constantly keep an eye on shifts in circumstances, always worrying what to do if he is wrong and ready to analysis why he is wrong, so people are always kept on their toes. It is a little like playing the stock market. The difference is that there is no material benefit involved, only mental enjoyment. Using scientific, quantitative prediction methods allows us constantly to increase the accuracy of our predictions. Our current quantitative predictions have already reached world-class level, especially in our method of quantitative assessment of bilateral relationships. Our work can stand alongside that of others in the world.
Lu Xin: You seem to be particularly enthusiastic speaking about this issue. Maybe it has something to do with your personality. You like being challenged.
Yan Xuetong: This may be wherein the special feature of international relations studies lies. To study international relations means to predict the developing trends in the international situation. Everybody judges you on whether your predictions are accurate or not. The predictions are objective and are a most plausible proof. Making public predictions is a risky business. Making public predictions about the international situation is a bit like adults playing games--it is real and enjoyable. Especially so when we use scientific methods to make a prediction. According to the results we can summarize the experience of our method and improve our method of prediction. It is especially meaningful to invent a method of research, just as interesting as inventing a new weapon.
Observation
(Extract from the book Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power)
Political hegemony stresses that moral influence is of capital importance. Moral influence comes from the merit and self-cultivation of the ruler and his important chief ministers and the policies that derive from this. Virtuous conduct is the basic requirement of the lord of the covenants, or rather of the hegemonic lord: “A great state determines by justice and thereby becomes the lord of the covenants.” And, “Without virtue how can one be lord of the covenants?” Duke Huan of Qi “relieved poverty, and paid the worthy and capable” and undertook to “examine our borders, return seized territory; correct the border marks” and to “not accept their money or wealth.” In this way he secured the hegemony for Qi. Duke Wen of Jin “revised his administration and spread grace on the ordinary people” and in this way realized the hegemony for Jin. Qin had a wealthy state and a strong army but, because the virtue of Duke Mu of Qin was inferior, in Qin “laws and commands were constantly issued.” “Laws was severe and lacking in mercy, only relying on coercion to keep people submissive.” Therefore, “it is fitting that Mu of Qin did not become lord of the covenants. Political hegemony holds that fidelity is the most important constituent component of moral influence: “fidelity so as to implement justice; justice so as to implement decrees.” Xunzi notes, “Huan of Qi, Wen of Jin, Zhuang of Chu, Helu of Wu, and Goujian of Yue all had states that were on the margins, yet they overawed all under heaven and their strength overpowered the central states. There was no other reason for this but that they had strategic reliability. This is to attain hegemony by establishing strategic reliability.”
